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Abstract: Efforts to increase wood mobilization have highlighted the need to appraise 
drivers of short-run timber supply. The current study aims to shed further light on 
harvesting decisions of private forest owners, by investigating optimal harvesting under 
uncertainty, when timber revenues are invested on financial markets and uncertainty is 
mitigated by news releases. By distinguishing between aggregate economic risk and sector 
specific risks, the model studies in great detail optimal harvesting-investment decisions, 
with particular emphasis on the non-trivial transmission of risk on optimal harvesting, and 
on the way private forest owners react to news and information. The analysis of the role 
played by information in harvesting decisions is a novelty in forest economic theory. The 
presented model is highly relevant from a policy—information is a commonly used forest 
policy instrument—as well as a practical perspective, since the mechanism of risk 
transmission is at the basis of timber pricing. 
Keywords: wood mobilization; timber supply; decision; uncertainty; risk; information; 
portfolio; financial market  
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Forest ownership structure is known to have implications for forest management and the production 
of timber and other forest products and services [1]. In the forest-rich regions of Central-East and 
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Northern Europe, private forest ownership is increasing at the expense of public ownership (Ibid.), a 
process often linked to the fragmentation of forest land and ensuing difficulties in mobilizing woody 
biomass [2]. This highlights the relevance of considering decision-making of private forest owners. 
Indeed, there is limited information regarding the behavior of private forest owners and their 
involvement in the timber market. However, though owners of fragmented forests have multiple 
objectives and attitudes (Ibid.), there is some empirical evidence to the effect that also for  
multi-objective owners, economic incitements are the most important (see, e.g., Kuuluvainen  
et al. [3]).  
Hence, building on previous partial equilibrium studies, the current model aims to shed further light 
on harvesting decisions of private forest owners. In particular, we study optimal consumption-saving 
and harvesting decisions of a risk-averse private forest owner that is allowed to invest harvest revenues 
on financial markets, when uncertainty is mitigated by news release. To the best of our knowledge, this 
model is the first in the literature to study the role of information in determining harvesting behavior. 
We believe that this is an important issue to be considered also from a policy perspective, since 
information can be a powerful tool to induce (socially) optimal behavior.  
An important caveat is in order here: the present model follows a well-established direction in the 
existing literature [4–10] in focusing on the inter-temporal wood supply problem, namely how  
forest-owners decide between “harvesting today” and “harvesting tomorrow”. This of course implies 
that other important aspects (e.g. pricing) must be left aside, in addition the model is extremely stylized 
since harvesting decisions are potentially affected by a multitude of variables not considered here, such 
as initial non-forest wealth, the age and sex of the forest owner, whether the forest owner lives on the 
estate or not, etc. However, using the approach proposed here, it is possible to develop alternative 
formulations to separately address these issues, so that our model could work as a useful starting point 
to investigate, in a broad sense, the role of information in forest economics, something which has so 
far been neglected. 
1.2. Harvesting Decisions under Uncertainty 
Using the Fisherian two-period consumption-saving-harvesting model, optimal timber harvesting 
under uncertainty has been extensively investigated [4–10]. That risk-averse landowners respond 
differently to uncertainty than risk-neutral ones has been established in a number of studies [11–14]. 
Further, as the authors of [9] point out “the necessity to take the stochastic nature of the world into 
account in forest management is widely accepted”. 
Johansson and Löfgren [4] show how timber price uncertainty under risk-aversion increases  
short-run timber supply. This result is confirmed in Koskela [5], who considers a more complex 
landowner's maximization problem, wherein optimal harvesting and consumption-saving decisions are 
derived under uncertain timber prices, and capital markets are characterized by a deterministic interest 
rate. The set of the available investment opportunities is further developed in Ollikainen [7,8], where 
optimal harvest decisions are derived under the possibility of (harvest) revenues investment in a risky 
asset. In particular, the authors of [8] extend what is claimed in [7], by assuming a stochastic future 
timber price. 
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The analysis of Ollikainen [8] shows that the behavior of risk-averse and risk-neutral forest owners 
differ depending on the position assumed on capital markets (borrowers or lenders), and the sign of the 
correlation between the interest rate and future timber price. Gong and Löfgren [10] bring further 
understanding of the problem by considering a richer set of investment possibilities that includes both 
a risky and a riskless asset, while still maintaining uncertainty on future timber price. In particular, 
assuming distributional independence between future timber price and the risky asset, while leaving 
the utility function unspecified, Gong and Löfgren derive conditions under which risk-aversion 
increases, reduces, or does not affect harvesting decisions with respect to risk-neutrality. 
The current study investigates optimal harvesting decisions under uncertainty, when forest owners 
are allowed to invest harvest revenues on financial markets and uncertainty is mitigated by news 
release. A model is developed that—albeit, like all theoretical frameworks, a simplification of 
reality—incorporates elements of realism worth considering to better understand forest owner 
behavior. In particular, we build on both Ollikainen [8] and Gong and Löfgren [10] to consider optimal 
consumption-saving and harvesting decisions of a risk-averse private forest owner, whose utility 
function is specified, as in [8], and timber revenues can be invested in a financial portfolio made by a 
risky and a riskless asset as in [10]. 
For what concerns the correlation between the asset and timber price [15], our framework allows for 
the distinction between aggregate economic (or, equivalently, undiversifiable) and idiosyncratic risk 
(or, equivalently, diversifiable, or sector specific). As is well known, in finance theory it is common to 
distinguish between risk due to the unique circumstances of a specific asset (idiosyncratic risk) and 
those correlated to the overall economy (aggregate economic risk). 
Following this idea, in our analysis we assume that the asset’s dividend and the future timber price 
both have two distinct components: A common aggregate economic component which is determined 
by a shock hitting the entire economy, including the forest sector and financial markets, and two 
separate idiosyncratic components. For the financial asset, the specific idiosyncratic component 
represents financial risk, while for future timber price it reflects risk specific to the forest sector. This 
particular structure is interesting since it allows studying how forest owners diversify between 
financial and timber markets in order to reduce idiosyncratic risk, and how risk is priced in  
timber markets. 
The main innovative feature of our framework is that we consider the arrival of news concerning 
the future, by means of a signal received immediately before the harvesting decision. In particular, we 
assume that the news concerns the real economy and either the financial or the forest sector. This 
representation can shed light on how private forest owners react to news and information, modifying 
their harvesting schedule accordingly. In particular, when analyzing the reaction to news about 
financial markets, the model makes it possible to assess how financial specific risk impacts on the 
harvesting decision, independently from economic risk. This feature is relevant, as there are examples 
of financial risk affecting timber markets [16], particularly given the somewhat specific characteristics 
of the recent financial crisis [17]. 
Alternatively, our framework could be used to model the response of private forest owners  
(i.e., short-run timber supply) to signals and communications related specifically to timber markets. 
This type of information is routinely released—by, e.g., Swedish forest owners associations (see,  
Forests 2013, 4  
 
 
1161 
e.g., [18])—presumably partly in order to increase current supply of timber. The model has clear 
policy relevance, seeing that information is a commonly used forest policy instrument [19]. 
Finally, the arrival of information and the presence of distinct sources of risk render the way timber 
and financial markets co-move non-trivial, providing some theoretical support to the contrasting 
findings on correlation from the empirical literature [20–24]. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 
presents the general framework, with particular emphasis on the modeling of uncertainty through 
aggregate economic and idiosyncratic risk, as well as the arrival of news. In Section 3, the model is 
solved. Section 4 discusses the implications of the proposed model.  
2. The Framework 
We consider a two-period economy in which a risk-averse private landowner wants to maximize the 
utility deriving from final wealth, by choosing how much to harvest and how much to invest on 
financial markets [25]. The utility index is assumed to be exponential with constant risk-aversion  
ρ:U = −exp(−ρw), where w represents wealth at time 2. 
Harvesting occurs in both periods, while financial investment made at time 1 returns its payoff at 
time 2. In particular, denoting by xi the quantity harvested at time i, and by pi the price at which wood 
harvested at time i is sold on the wood market, we assume that timber revenues p1x1 are invested at 
time 1 on the financial market. 
Two assets are available: a risk-free bond with gross return (1 + rf), and a risky asset that pays out a 
dividend d at time 2 per unit of investment at time 1. We denote by ϖ the fraction of p1x1 invested in 
the risk-free asset. Therefore, the investment portfolio will be generically indicated as (1 − ϖ,ϖ). 
Finally, we denote by Q the initial forest endowment, and by g its growth function, with g satisfying 
standard properties, such as: (i) g(0) = 0, (ii) g′ > 0, (iii) g′′ < 0. 
Given the amount harvested at time 1, x1, the stock available at time 2 is uniquely defined by the 
growth function g and the initial endowment Q. In addition, since we are assuming that utility derives 
from final wealth only, and that the rotations beyond the second period are ignored, it also follows that 
such a stock will be entirely harvested at time 2, so that:  
                  (1) 
2.1. Uncertainty 
When the landowner makes his harvesting-investment decision at time 1, the future timber price p2 
and the realized dividend of the asset d are not known, however their respective distribution are. In 
particular, d = m + εa + εi; p2 = m + εa + εf m, m  ⁺⁺, εaN(0, a
2
), εiN(0, i
2
), εfN(0, f
2
).  
m and m are the expected asset dividend and the expected future timber price, respectively, which 
are both known at time 1. We assume that m > 1 + rf. 
The asset dividend d and the future timber price p2 have a common component εa that represents an 
aggregate shock affecting the entire economy, including financial markets and the forest sector. 
Therefore, the variance of εa, a
2
, can be thought of as a measure of aggregate economic (or, 
equivalently, undiversifiable) risk. 
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The two shocks εi and εf are mutually independent, and in addition they are also independent from 
εa. Therefore, they represent specific shocks exclusively affecting financial markets (εi), and the forest 
sector (εf). Hence, i
2
 and f
2
 can be thought of as measures of idiosyncratic risk: financial risk (i
2
), 
and forest sector risk (f
2
), respectively. 
2.2. Information Arrival  
While uncertainty resolves by time 2, with the realizations of the asset dividend and the timber 
price, some news concerning the asset already arrives at time 1 through a signal s. In particular, 
            (2) 
where εs is a noise distributed according to εsN(0, s
2
). Notice that the signal in itself is a random 
variable, however its realization becomes known one period ahead with respect to the asset’s dividend 
and the timber price (that is, at time 1 instead of time 2). The signal is already partially informative 
about the asset’s price because of the two components εi and (scaled) εa. However the information 
about the asset’s brought by the signal is disturbed by the presence of a noise, εs, which renders s 
imprecise depending on its variance s
2
. 
s
2
 is a measure of the precision of the signal, since higher s
2
 induces also higher variability of the 
signal and, therefore, lower precision.   [0,1] represents the degree to which the signal is specific to 
the asset. If  = 1, the signal is simply a noisy estimate of the dividend d, and therefore it is partially 
informative about the aggregate shock εa, and, consequently, about p2. In contrast, if  = 0, the signal 
exclusively brings information for the financial market and it cannot be used to infer the timber price at 
time 2. For clarity, one can imagine that, when the signal is announced, the forest owner estimates its 
degree of specificity to the asset. 
The informativeness of the signal with respect to the dividend and the timber price respectively is 
defined usually as γd = (cov(s,d))/(var(s)) and γp2 = (cov(s,p2))/(var(s)). Notice that by construction the 
signal is less informative with respect to the future timber price as reflected in γd > γp2 is also important 
to notice that an increase in aggregate economic risk a
2
 makes the signal more informative (higher) 
for the forest price, while the opposite holds for an increase in financial specific risk i
2
. 
Given our assumptions, s, p2|s and d2|s are also normally distributed. In particular, standard 
Bayesian updating leads to: 
                     
          
   (3)  
          
              
    
   (4)  
                 
    
  (5)  
Notice that, when the signal is specific to the asset only, that is, when  = 0, the expected 
conditional future price, E[p2|s], is equal to the unconditional one, E[p2] = m, while the conditional 
covariance between the dividend and the price, Cov(d, p2|s), is equal to a
2
, since εi and εf are 
independent. For this reason, if not explicitly mentioned otherwise, in the following we will assume 
that   0. 
Also notice that conditional covariance increases as aggregate economic risk increases (i.e., the 
higher a
2
 is), while it reduces the signal becomes more precise (i.e., the lower s
2
 is, and/or less 
Forests 2013, 4  
 
 
1163 
financially specific (i.e., the higher ) is. In addition, if the signal concerned aggregate economic risk 
only, that is, s = αεa + εs, covariance would be higher than in (5), provided that the signal is sufficiently 
precise (i.e., s
2
 is sufficiently low). 
3. The Model  
At the beginning of period 1, the forest owner is endowed with a forest stock Q, characterized by 
growth function g. The current timber price is p1, while the future price p2 is known to be distributed 
according to p2N(m, a
2
 + f
2
).  
The revenues p1x1 from timbers harvested at time 1, x1, are invested on financial markets; more 
precisely, a fraction ϖ of p1x1 is invested in a risk-free bond with gross return 1 + rf, while the 
remaining fraction 1 − ϖ is invested in a risky asset that pays out a dividend d in the second period. At 
the beginning of period 1, d is known to be distributed according to dN(m, a
2
 + i
2
). 
Hence the agent’s maximization problem consists in choosing optimal current timber supply x1, and 
the investment portfolio (ϖ, 1 − ϖ) in order to maximize the utility from final wealth w. 
Given harvesting level x1 and the portfolio (ϖ, 1 − ϖ), final wealth at time 2 is: 
                              (6)  
where x2 is given by (1). 
Before the harvesting and investment decisions are taken, the agent receives some news concerning 
the financial market by means of a signal s = αεa + εi + εs [26]. This information is then used to update 
the priors of p2 and d, and henceforth to choose optimal contingent harvesting x1 and the portfolio  
(ϖ, 1 − ϖ). In particular, the maximization problem becomes: 
                                        (7)  
under the constraint given by the growth function (1). 
Since both p2|s and d|s are normally distributed, so is w|s. Further, the utility index is a standard 
CARA exponential utility [27], so that the expected utility of w given the signal s is a strictly 
increasing transformation of the kernel        
 
          , where               
    
                         
    and            
            
    
              
     
     2+1−    2. 
3.1. First Order Conditions 
The first order conditions associated to the maximization problem (7) yield: 
      
              
                         
   
 (8) 
   
   
                   
     
    
               (9) 
where x2 is given by (1). 
Notice that,          , (9) holds only if     
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3.1.1. Harvesting and Investment 
When analyzing the relationship between the optimal short-run supply of timber, x1, and the 
financial portfolio (ϖ, 1 − ϖ), it is easy to notice that the investment in the risky asset (1 − ϖ)p1x1 is 
not affected by the specific level of current harvesting x1. Hence, if harvesting is increased at time 1, 
the extra-revenues from timber sales are invested into the risk-free asset, and not in the risky one. In a 
similar fashion, as long as the signal on the financial market is observable, even if the landowner was 
given the possibility to exclusively invest in the risk-free asset [28], the optimal short-run supply of 
wood would be given by the same x1 solving (9) [29]. 
In general, there is a trade-off between investing in the risk-free asset and allowing the forest to 
grow to time 2. This immediately appears in the first order condition (9): If m falls, x1 (harvesting in 
the first period) increases and the total investment in the risk-free asset increases as well. Similarly, if 
p1 or rf increases, so do x1 and the investment in the risk-free asset. 
3.1.2. Harvesting and Risk 
The increase in aggregate economic risk and in the two idiosyncratic risks impacts the short-run 
supply of timber (x1), and therefore investment. In particular, if risk in the forest sector f
2
 increases, 
so does current harvesting x1 and the investment in the risk-free asset, as can be expected. Similarly, if 
risk-aversion  increases, so does x1. The investment in the risk-free asset increases as well, but this 
time also because the investment in the risky asset (1 − ϖ) is reduced by the increase in risk-aversion. 
Inspection of the first order condition (9) reveals an interesting result: when the asset specific risk 
i
2
 increases, this is transmitted to the optimal harvested quantity through the signal s. In particular, the 
signal's informativeness is reduced as reflected in the decrease of    . If the signal conveys good news, 
a higher financial risk i
2
 unequivocally increases short-run timber supply, ceteris paribus. In case of a 
negative signal, instead, the effect is a priori ambiguous [30]. However, for high risk aversion, again 
short run supply increases when asset specific risk increases, ceteris paribus.  
The effect of financial risk i
2
 on optimal harvesting is due to the presence of the common 
aggregate economic component εa and the signal s on the asset's dividend. Further, as noted above, 
under these assumptions financial risk i
2
 affects optimal harvest as long as the agent observes the 
signal, no matter if he is given the actual possibility to invest in the risky asset or not. On the contrary, 
if no signal was received, and/or p2, s and d had no common component, the first order condition 
associated to the optimal harvesting quantity would not depend on i
2
. 
To the best of our knowledge, our model is the first in the literature to suggest that financial 
idiosyncratic risk can have an impact on harvesting behavior. Despite the relative difficulty in 
providing an accurate empirical analysis of this claim, the observation of the patterns followed by 
timber markets during, in particular, the first phase of the recent financial downturn might support this 
idea, as discussed in more detail in Section 4. 
Finally, it is interesting to notice how harvesting and financial investment react differently to an 
increase in aggregate economic risk. For simplicity, consider the case α = 1. An increase in the 
aggregate economic risk a
2
 will always reduce the investment in the risky asset (1 − ϖ), no matter 
what the realization of the signal and the level of risk-aversion  are. The reaction of the harvesting 
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schedule is instead ambiguous for a positive signal and it depends on risk-aversion,  [31] , if  is quite 
low, an increase in aggregate economic risk could possibly lead to a reduction in current harvesting 
level x1 [32].  
This result indicates that the forest owner is behaving differently when deciding about timber 
harvesting compared to the evaluation of financial assets. In particular, let us consider an alternative 
risky asset at the place of the forest, with dividend d = p2. The first order condition associated to this 
problem shows that, in case of a positive signal, the variation of the investment in the second asset in 
response to an increase in a
2
, is ambiguous, but in this case the sign of the reaction depends on the 
relative magnitude of variances, expected dividend, risk-free rate and signal realization, but not on the 
level of risk-aversion. 
Even if it is beyond the scope of this paper to empirically evaluate the validity of the framework 
proposed, these findings seem to suggest that timber prices and financial markets co-move in quite a 
complicated manner, presenting both significant and negligible correlation; as empirical evidence from 
the literature also seems to suggest (see Section 4). 
3.1.3. Harvesting and the Signal Realization  
We next investigate how harvesting is affected by the “positivity” of the information conveyed by 
the signal. 
Suppose that s = 0, so that the updated expected dividend and timber price after having observed 
the signal do coincide with the unconditional ones, namely, E[d|s] = m, and E[p2|s] = m. 
Let us denote by x1° the solution to (9) when the realization of the signal is s = 0. 
Next, we define the function (x1,s), such that (m,x1,s,α,,p1,rf) 
   
   
                 
   2  2+  2+ 11+  . Hence, (m,x1°,s,α,,p1,rf) = 0. 
An increase of the signal to s > 0 (that is, the arrival of good news) translates into 
(m,x1°,s,α,,p1,rf) < 0. Since,           and  
    
      , the new equilibrium requires a lower 
x1, so that the short-run supply of wood is reduced. As a consequence, also the total investment in the 
financial market p1x1 is reduced. In addition, given the positivity of the signal, the investment portfolio 
(ϖ, 1 − ϖ) is tilted towards the risky asset. 
Summarizing, the arrival of good news induces a reduction in current harvesting (which in turn 
translates in a decrease of current wealth) and in the proportion of current wealth invested in the  
risk-free bond in favor of the one in the risky investment. The opposite happens if the signal conveys 
bad news (that is if s < 0); in this particular instance, harvesting at time 1 is increased, and the 
financial portfolio is tilted towards the risk-free asset.  
3.2. Information 
The informativeness of the signal depends on risks a
2
, i
2
, precision s
2
, and the specificity 
parameter, α. Higher precision (i.e., lower s
2
) translates into higher informativeness for both the 
dividend and the price. Hence, the new equilibrium requires a lower x1 and an investment portfolio 
more tilted towards the risky investment (that is, higher (1 − ϖ)). Therefore the investment in the  
risk-free asset is reduced because of the reduction of x1, but also because of the change in the optimal 
portfolio composition. 
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If good news arrives (s > 0), short-run supply reduces as α increases [33]. This simply means that 
the more the signal becomes informative about aggregate economic risk, the stronger the forest 
landowner reacts to it (reducing the short-run supply of wood). In case of a negative signal the result is 
ambiguous: on one side a very trustable negative signal would induce an increase in the current-supply 
of wood. On the other hand, the fact that the signal is less specific to financial markets reduces the 
conditional variance of future timber price (i.e., its overall risk), and consequently short-run supply 
is reduced. 
3.2.1. Information Specific to the Timber Market  
In the following we assume that the signal, s, concerns the price of timber at time 2. In particular,  
              (10)  
If α = 0, the signal exclusively brings information about the timber price, and it cannot be used to 
infer any information about the financial market. The first order condition for harvesting associated to 
the maximization problem yields: 
   
   
                   
     
           
               (11)  
where x2 is given by (1). 
As before, since          , the first order condition associated to optimal harvesting holds only 
if                  
     
           
     . 
Using this alternative formulation, one obtains that f
2
 affects the optimal investment in the 
financial asset while the specific financial risk i
2
 has no influence on the harvest level. 
To facilitate the analysis, let us here assume that i
2
 = f
2
. When comparing (9) and (11), the role 
played by the degree of informativeness of the signal immediately becomes apparent. In particular, as 
is intuitive, a positive signal induces a higher reduction in the short-run supply of wood when the 
signal itself is supposed to be informative about the forest sector, as it is in (11).  
This does not immediately follow in the case of a negative signal: on the one hand a very trustable 
negative signal would induce an increase in the current-supply of wood. On the other hand, the high 
degree of informativeness is perceived as a reduction in risk and therefore it reduces current supply x1. 
In particular, for higher levels of risk aversion this second effect could prevail. 
Comparative statics with respect to the parameters m, s, , , α, a
2
, f
2
, s
2
, rf and p can be carried 
out as in the previous case. 
3.2.2. The Importance of Information  
In this section, we briefly discuss the role played by the signal when the information conveyed does 
not add anything with respect to the initial expectations. This occurs when the realized signal (on the 
risky asset or on future timber price) takes value 0. In such an instance, the first order condition for 
optimal harvesting associated to the maximization problem will be: 
   
   
              
     
    
               (12) 
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if the signal is related to the financial market, and: 
   
   
              
     
           
               (13) 
if the signal is specific to the forest sector. 
We label the solution of the above equations x1
A
 and x1
B
, respectively. We denote by x1 the optimal 
solution if no signal is received, and, to facilitate the comparison, we assume i
2
 = f
2
. Even if the 
updated expectations have not changed, the mere existence of the signal has strong impact on the 
optimal harvesting/investment quantities, through the reduced conditional variance, and therefore risk. 
In particular, x1
B 
< x1
A 
< x1, that is, the more the signal is specific to the forest sector, the more it 
reduces uncertainty. Notice that this implies that different landowners could react to the same signal in 
different ways, depending on whether they consider the signal more related to the forest sector or to 
financial markets. The difference |x1
A − x1| reduces as i
2
, f
2
 increase, while it increases as  and 
a
2
 increase.  
Therefore, the reply to the signal is stronger the higher the aggregate economic risk a
2
 is, and the 
more informative the signal is. In contrast, f
2
 and i
2
 reduce the credibility of the signal. Indeed, when 
aggregate economic risk is high, it is relatively more important for the forest owner to receive a signal, 
so that he/she tends to “over-react” with respect to it. On the other hand, financial risk and the signal 
precision do not directly affect timber prices, which is why their increase simply adds disturbance to 
the interpretation of the signal, so that the forest owner becomes more cautious. 
It is also worth noting that—even if in both cases considered above, the signals bring the same 
information about the economic component—the reaction to the signal of the second agent is stronger, 
simply because informativeness itself is stronger [34]. 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper we have presented a theoretical model of optimal harvesting-investment decision for a 
private forest owner who invests the revenues from timber sale on financial markets. The framework 
has two main characteristics: (i) the role of information and (ii) the way uncertainty is modeled. As far 
as it has been possible to ascertain, this is the first theoretical paper investigating the effect of 
information on harvesting decisions. When modeling uncertainty, we explicitly allow for a distinction 
between aggregate economic risk and sector specific risk, such as financial and forestry risk 
respectively. Obviously it is beyond the scope of this paper to try to establish a direct linkage between 
concrete empirical facts and the results of our model. Nevertheless, the particular structure used here 
permits financial specific risk to influence harvesting behavior (see Section 3.1.2. above), and, along 
with the introduction of the information component, it furthers the understanding of recent trends in 
timber prices that are difficult to explain using standard models. 
For example, when the housing sector collapsed in US, timber prices in Sweden plummeted 
dramatically, as expected. However, they dropped even further after Lehman Brothers’  
bankruptcy [16]. To make a parallelism with the framework presented above, the Lehman Brothers’ 
breakdown could be interpreted as the “arrival of a signal”, carrying information on both aggregate 
economic and financial risk, affecting economic operators (including those in the forest sector) all over 
the world. Indeed, though the growth forecasts had already been gradually corrected downward since 
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August 2007 [17], they dropped dramatically only with the collapse of Lehman Brothers’, an event 
which apparently took market participants by surprise and therefore induced a strong reaction in prices.  
The presence of common aggregate economic risk (due to the potential occurrence of a shock, εa) 
and the arrival of financial information make the way financial and timber markets interact non-trivial, 
reconciling the mixed empirical evidence reported in the literature. Indeed, there is no consensus on 
the way timber prices and financial markets co-move. On one side, some studies have found a positive 
correlation between timber and financial markets [20,21], while quite a few studies point out that forest 
investments are an attractive alternative for risk diversification, due to negligible correlation with 
financial assets (see, e.g., [22–24]).  
Even if ours is not an equilibrium model, so that both financial and timber prices are exogenous, 
observing the conditional covariance between timber price and asset dividend one could partially 
accommodate these contrasting findings. Indeed, conditional covariance varies in value depending on 
the severity of aggregate economic risk and the specific information received (see Section 2.2.). 
Finally, Heikkinen [21]—using time series data for the period from January 1988 to September  
1999—finds that the correlation between timber and financial markets increases over time. This 
finding seems to be consistent with the idea that harvesting decision-making adjusts to the arrival of 
new information. This is also why we contend that the role of information in harvesting decision 
should be further investigated. 
The accommodation of the role played by information/news in the model—particularly information 
specific to timber markets—is of relevance from a policy perspective. Hence, information is a 
frequently used policy tool, and the way information affects harvesting decisions is thus of interest, 
especially in light of the efforts to increase wood mobilization in many European countries. As an 
example, information about timber markets, coupled with recommendations not to postpone harvest, 
features frequently in forest owner associations membership magazines, presumably partly with the 
objective to increase the short-run supply of timber (see, e.g., [18]).  
Thus the model presented here can be used as a starting point for exploring an area of forest 
economics well worth considering, not least from a policy perspective and with very concrete 
applications. For example, departing from the approach proposed here, it is possible to develop an 
alternative framework suitable for analyzing how different degrees of information penetration affect 
the equilibrium price of timber. Alternatively, one could investigate how the release of information 
could be used as a policy tool to optimally induce higher/lower levels of timber supply among forest 
owners, depending on their specific characteristics (e.g., stand characteristics related to the extent of 
non-timber forest values). These topics will be part of our future research. 
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